Most current studies involving prisoner's dilemma games are formulated under the assumption that participators are rational during collective interaction. Although irrationality in some patterns has been considered in the evolution, the effects brought about by the hatred of the rich mentality have never been investigated. Here, we introduce a cumulative reward-based rule where a player will adopt an irrational strategy which is expressed in defection in the game if the cumulative reward of the opponent exceeds the threshold controlled by a given parameter. Interestingly, despite irrational defection, such rules will result in the best environment for cooperator's viability. In addition, we have demonstrated that irrationality in this form could be favorable for the average allocation of wealth in terms of Gini coefficient.
Introduction
Cooperation behavior is ubiquitous and crucial, not only in human society but also in nature. How cooperators can survive and persist for a long time in an egoism dominant population is an evolutionary puzzle in biology, economy, and social science. 1 To address this kind of puzzle, evolutionary game theory has provided a powerful framework in analyzing and modeling. 2 The prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) has become a paradigm for investigating the evolution of cooperation among individuals with pairwise interactions. 1, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] In a standard PDG, two players participate in the game; they can either cooperate (C) or defect (D) with the opponent. If both players choose to cooperate in the game, each of them will get a pay-off with magnitude R. If one of them defects while the opponent cooperates, the defector gets the highest reward T, while the cooperator gets S. In the case of mutual defection, both players get punishment P. Following the standard setting, the payoff obeys the condition T . R . P . S. The payoff relationship R . P implies that mutual cooperation is superior to mutual defection, while the payoff relationships T . R and P . S imply that defection is the dominant strategy for both agents. According to classical game theory, both players should play defection (D), since this is the only strong Nash equilibrium in the game. However, mutual defection would provide them with the second worst reward, which creates the dilemma.
In real life, people always encounter the situation of prisoner's dilemma when they must make a choice between being selfish or altruistic, to follow the norm ethical or not, to work hard or be lazy. 12, 13 Some political and business negotiations are also burdened with this type of dilemma. Besides, previous work has shown that the prisoner's dilemma can be recognized in the behavior of hermaphroditic fish when they release eggs and sperm alternately, 14 since the production of eggs implies a higher metabolic investment. However, the application is not restricted to human or animal societies. The defective and cooperative versions have been identified when considering the interactions between two bacteriophages living and reproducing within infected cells. 15 Moreover, the study of two-dimensional models helps us to understand how altruistic behavior occurs in biofilms. [16] [17] [18] [19] Some scholars speculate that in multicellular organisms, cells can be 20 Game theoretical methods may also provide a promising approach in understanding the mechanisms of cancer. 21, 22 Despite the mutual defection result in classical game theory, the cooperator and cooperative behavior can subsist in multi-agent models. In the study by Nowak and May, 11 the authors introduced a spatial evolutional game in the square lattice based on a cellular automation mechanism where the player located on each site of a square lattice follows two memoryless strategies in defection or cooperation and plays with neighbors in each round. In the next round, players will follow the strategy from the neighbor with highest payoff in the last round. The simulation results demonstrate that local interactions within a spatial structure can maintain cooperative behavior. Those results obtained by cellular automaton have spurned people to develop a variety of models to hatch out of the evolutionary stalemate. In the work by Nowak et al., 23 the authors studied different spatial structures including random grid, triangular and cubic lattices, where the sites were randomly distributed on a rectangular block with periodic boundary conditions. The results show that cooperation can be maintained in spatial models with randomness. Different from mechanisms that concentrate on spatial structure, voluntary participation was introduced recently by adding the third group ''loner'' beyond cooperators and defectors. 24 This mechanism was demonstrated to be an effective policy in preventing defectors from exploiting cooperators. Similar to this arrangement, in the study by Nowak et al. players are allowed to make a choice from a finite subset of stochastic reactive strategies. 23 The results show that the addition of some strategy supports the prevalence of cooperation in the whole range of payoff parameters. Moreover, in the context of the prisoner's dilemma, a simple tag-based model was introduced by Hales. 25 In this model, each player is placed with a tag which can take a finite number of discrete values. A tag is a phenotypic marker like age, sex, cultural traits, language, or other features that can be distinguished. The simulation results show that cooperative behavior will flourish when there are a sufficient number of tags. In the study by Santos et al., 26 the public good game has been studied on a square lattice and in a network. The results demonstrate that the diversity in the number and size of public good game together with that of in individual player can contribute to the promotion of cooperation behavior. All the above studies provide us with a novel viewpoint in understanding game theory in society.
Previous mechanisms that have been demonstrated to be effective in promoting cooperation can be categorized based on the way of discriminating defectors. Players are either tagged, 25 grouped, or punished for the sake of altruism. However, individuals are not always characterized in the way described above. Cumulative wealth can also be adopted as a criterion in evaluating players. Due to the unequal holding in wealth, we observe that the hatred of the rich mentality is a prevalent mental phenomenon from middle classes of society as well as individual merchants in the oligopoly market. 19 The hatred of the rich mentality has never been considered to have a positive effect in the commercial market or human society. However, in our study, we demonstrate that individuals with moderate levels of such mentality may contribute to the persistence of the cooperation behavior in the PDG. Therefore, this study may provide a paradigm for the disadvantaged minority and vulnerable groups to survivor in a greedy dominant community.
To quantify the hatred of the rich mentality, we consider individuals with a tolerance toward cumulative wealth in our model. Such mentality is expressed in the following way: a player will not cooperate in the game if the cumulative wealth of an opponent is far more than that of himself, and this is equal to the strategy of defection. We define the strategy learned from a neighbor as a rational strategy since it does not contain the hatred emotion, and the strategy subjectively modified due to the gap in cumulative payoff as irrational strategy. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second part, we describe the model based on the hatred of the rich mentality. In the third part we present the experiment results, which are followed by discussions and conclusions of this paper.
Model
Now let us briefly introduce our model. At the start of evolution, we follow the protocol setting of PDG, i.e., each player, who occupies one site of the square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, adopts one of the two pure strategies, cooperate (C) or defect (D), with equal probability. In each generation, each member will play a game with all Moore neighborhoods including itself. It has to be mentioned that the main results still hold if self-interactions are not considered in the model. The strategy of the player in each generation can be either rational or irrational.
The rational strategy of unit i in the tth generation is represented by S t i , which is learned from the rational strategy of a neighbor with highest reward in the last step (we believe only the rational strategies are learnable). The updating mechanisms are similar to those of the traditional model and will be presented in the following explanation.
The irrational strategy is unreserved defection once adopted. We define the actions triggered by the hatred mentality to be irrational. The participators will behave irrationally once the opponent's accumulated reward goes beyond the limits of tolerance. We use M t i to represent the accumulative reward of the participator i:
where p j i is the payoff of the player i in the jth step. Besides, R t i and A t i denote the range and average, respectively, of the accumulated reward separately among the group composed by the neighbors of player i:
Here, d i is the Moore neighbor of i (including i) and d i j j is the quantity of neighbors. Based on above definition, the degree of hatred mentality can be quantized.
We define the limit at which the participant ceases to be rational. The tolerance of player i toward an opponent is given by the following:
If the above condition has been reached in the game participated by unit i and q, the player i will behave irrationally in the game. This implies that when q's accumulated reward is at a level higher than player i can tolerate, i will choose the strategy of defection without consideration.
Parameter F with the range F 2 À1, 1 ½ is designed to measure the level of a participator's enmity to the wealth group. A large F reflects a low level of hatred mentality, so that player will be less likely to adopt an irrational strategy in the game.
With the strategy in operation, the payoff matrix is given by:
Afterwards, all the participators will modify the rational strategies according to the following updating rule: player i randomly selects one of his neighbors j, and i adopts j's strategy with the following probability:
with k . 0. Here k is a parameter measuring the amplitude of the noise. For k . 0, it is possible that a strategy with less reward will be adopted. But in most cases, selfish and rational players prefer a strategy from a successful neighbor. In the present work, we simply fix k = 0:1. Details for the tth generation, which are illustrated in Figure 1 , are as follows: 
Experiment results
Simulations were carried out for a population of size N = 200 3 200 on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, so the lattice is like a torus. It should be noted that the main conclusion remains unchanged for size in different population. All the results are based on ten times simulation. Initially, the two strategies of cooperate and defect are randomly initialized among the players with equal possibility. A synchronous updating rule based on the pairwise comparison for a fixed noise level (i.e., k = 0:1) is adopted for strategy evolution. To simplify the simulation, we adopt F i = F, indicating that all of the individuals have the same F. In what follows, we will investigate how the tolerance factor F affects the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, the effects brought about by such setting to the wealth distribution will also be covered. 
Cooperation rate in rational strategy
All the participators own a rational strategy in each step, which is obtained from Fermi based updating in the last round (defined by S t i in our model). In the simulation, for different values of T , the fraction of the cooperators in the rational strategy is generated by averaging over the last 1000 time steps of the total 12,000, when the fraction of the cooperators is stable with little fluctuation. Experimental results are presented in Figure 2 .
In Figure 2 , with a low value of F, the proportion of cooperation in the rational strategy achieves 100%, and this proportion will monotonously decrease with the enhancement of F. This result indicates that with the reduction of the level of hatred, the strategy of defection emerged in the rational strategy of the population, and the proportion of the cooperation in the rational strategy could decrease to 0 with relative high level of T . For the case that T is equal to 1.2, the proportion declines from 100% to 70% with the value of F around 0.13, and is stable at 60% when F . 0:2.
The rational strategy of participators is obtained based on reward in each round. Figure 2 shows that the hatred emotion will lead to the promotion in the proportion of cooperation. As for the reason behand that, we can consider two extreme cases, i.e., when the hatred mentality is at a relatively high level and the point where no hatred exists. For the case when no hatred exists, the result is evident. When the defection reward T is large, a unit with strategy of defection can obtain more reward in each round. The selfish player will follow the strategy with higher payoff, which promotes the spreading of defection, whereas the system can still maintain a certain level of cooperators with low defection reward. When the hatred mentality in a population is set at an extremely high level, this will make a unit in the lattice more easily become irrational in the game; the selfish individual cannot benefit from defection, thus the lattice will be dominated by cooperators.
Cooperation rate in practice
In our model, a player in the game can be either rational or irrational, which is controlled by the tolerance to the accumulative reward. We use F to measure the degree of hatred. Here we discuss the influence of F to the cooperation rate in practice. The strategy in practice is the strategy a player adopted in the game, based on which the reward of each side can be determined. For the given parameters, the proportion of the cooperation in practice with different defection reward T is presented in Figure 3 .
In Figure 3 , as you can see, the strategy in practice is defection dominant with F smaller than 20.26. The reason for this result is that an individual's tolerance toward the opponent's wealth is at a lower level when F is relative small, which makes it easier for the irrational strategy to be triggered in the game. The experiment results indicate that the entire population adopts the defect in the game although the rational strategy is cooperation dominant (see Figure 2) .
As for the condition F 2 ½À0:26, 0:2, with the setting T = 1:2, the proportion of cooperation in practice is promoted with the increase of F, ultimately stabilized at 60%. With the setting of T = 1:22, 1:23, 1:25, the proportion of the cooperation will slightly decrease after reaching the culmination and is stabilized at a relative high level ultimately. When we choose higher defection reward, i.e., T = 1:3, 1:35, 1:4, 1:6, 1:8, the rate is promoted with increasing F at the beginning, but is decreased when F . 0 and achieved a maximum value of 0:5 with F = 0. As for the case of T = 1:3, 1:35, the system will stabilize with a defection dominant condition, but a low proportion of cooperators are still maintained. For T = 1:4, 1:6, the strategy in cooperation will become extinct when F is relative large.
The different cooperation rates between rational strategy and that in practice depend on whether the unit chooses to be irrational in the game. Thus, the margins of cooperation rate in Figures 2 and 3 reflect the level of irrational mentality. This may give an explanation to the trend of the cooperator fraction in Figure 3 . When the hatred mentality is relatively small, i.e., F is set at a high value larger than 0:15, the irrational strategy is not widely adopted in the game, strategies are rational dominant. This results in the cooperation rate in practice being similar to the rate in the rational strategy, as shown in the latter part of Figure3. As for the case when hatred mentality is intensive, each unit will adopt an irrational strategy in the game, which leads to the situation when no cooperator exists with F \ À 0:25. When the hatred emotion is moderate, the strategy in practice contains both rational and irrational parts. Since a degree of tolerance to the rich is promoted, only some of the participators are triggered to become irrational in the game. Besides, due to the higher reward in defection, the rational defectors are more likely to be treated as irrational in the game, because those individuals can accumulate more reward in the previous round and still defect in the current round. Thus, despite the irrational defector being treated with defection due to higher reward, this mechanism of hatred of the rich can still suppress the feasibility of exploiting cooperators. In addition, it also inhibits the propagation of defection.
With the above results presented in Figures 2 and 3 , we can come out with some conclusions. The parameter F measures the level of an individual's hatred mentality. When we increase parameter F from 20.3 to 0.3, this corresponds to the degree of hatred being attenuated from extremely to moderate and to non-existence. The results show that when the reward of defection (value T ) is cheap, the emotion of hatred to the rich is not favorable for the viability of the cooperation. However, when the reward of the defection is attractive, the cooperator will start to subsist in a light hatred environment. In this scenario, the cooperator proportion will keep growing with moderate emotion of hatred, even though an excess of such emotion will be distinct to the cooperators. So, we can conclude that with an attractive defection reward, a moderate hatred of the rich mentality could promote cooperation in the PDG.
Gini coefficient with level of hatred
Since the strategy in practice determines the payoff of participators, we use the following Gini coefficient:
to measure the statistical dispersion of group income, which is a commonly used benchmark for inequality.
Here, y i is the uniform on the reward, indexed in nondecreasing order y i \ y i+1 . The Gini coefficients under different values of T are obtained by averaging over the last 1000 time steps of the total 12,000; we find the result is stable with little variance. Details are presented in Figure 4 . From Figure 4 , with T = 1:2, the Gini coefficient changes monotonically with an increasing level of F. For the scenario of T = 1:3, 1:4, 1:5, 1:6, the Gini coefficient achieve the minimum with F around À0:01, located between 0:4 and 0:5. This indicates that, when the reward for defection is attractive, moderate hatred of the rich could encourage the even spread of wealth. The reason for such results is evident, since the moderate hatred can promote the fraction of cooperators with F around the zero point. Compared to a defector dominant system, a cooperation based community is more eager to provide an equivalent wealth distribution, since the game composed of two cooperators can always get the same amount of reward in each round.
Discussion and conclusion
Recently, we have studies the PDG by considering participators with hatred of the rich mentality in a square lattice. In our work, we consider a tolerance threshold parameter, i.e., if the opponent's accumulation reward is greater than the threshold, the player will behave irrationally, which is expressed as defection in the game. In summary, we have shown that a moderate such mentality will result in the optimal cooperation proportion at a certain tolerance range. Interestingly, the hatred emotion can always encourage participators to cooperate when their behavior is rational. In other words, the increase in the extent of hatred will always be followed by the promotion in the cooperation rate. Thereby, this finding may provide a paradigm for the disadvantaged minority and vulnerable groups to survive in a greedy dominant community. Finally, we have investigated the effects on the income distribution via the Gini coefficient. We find that moderate hatred could also encourage the even spread of wealth.
However, there is some limitation in our model which can be improved in future study. One of the assumptions in our model is the hatred of the rich is homogenous and is always at a fixed level for both self-player and opponent player (we set F i = F). We make this assumption to simplify the procedures in the simulation. However, the hatred emotion is more likely to vary from person to person, and the standards they use may also change with opponent from different classes. Thereby, in this scenario, the main conclusion may not change, since the hatred emotion still exists, but some interesting results may emerge from a more complex and inhomogeneous model. Besides, although we include self-interaction in our model, we do not consider hatred of the rich for the player itself. The player just plays a rational game in the self-interaction. Although the hatred mentality toward self is not commonly found in reality, it may lead to interesting results. Further studies are necessary to give a complete and impressive conclusion. Moreover, in our model, because we assume that only rational strategies are learnable, the player will follow the rational strategy from a unit with higher reward in the last round. This is reasonable since the irrational strategy is self-based, varying among different players. Besides, learning of irrational strategy is not feasible under the cellular automation. However, the learning in such a form may be possible under other mechanisms such as Monte Carlo simulation; this is also an interesting topic for future study.
